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Wt's Time to Abolish North Carolina's Parent-Child Immunity,
But Who's Going to Do lt?--Coffey v. Coffey and North
Carolina General Statutes Section 1-539.21
It is doubtful if any age promises a sweeter remembrance than that of a
happy childhood, spent in the lovelight of kindly smiles and in the
radiance of parental devotion. "Honor thy father and thy mother that
thy days may be long upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth
thee" is an injunction from on high, and it contains as much truth
today as it did under the Mosaic dispensation. Verily, it is a command
of Holy Writ-good for all time.'
With this dreamy statement, Justice W.P. Stacy brought North Carolina
into the mainstream of legal thought in 1923 by adopting for his state the par-
ent-child immunity as a bar to suits between unemancipated minors and their
parents. A creature of American common law, the immunity was created in
18912 to avoid the disruption of family harmony viewed by courts as necessary
for a strong democratic society.3 A majority of states soon adopted the immu-
nity, also formulating new justifications for the doctrine.4 As Justice Stacy's
language suggests, preservation of family harmony was the main reason for the
adoption of the parent-child immunity in North Carolina, although his opinion
recognized and accepted other justifications for the immunity as well.5
Sixty-seven years later, however, it has become apparent that the immunity
is not "good for all time." The immunity originally presented an absolute bar to
a child's tort suit against his parents,6 but courts have narrowed the immunity
over the years by exceptions7 and legal writers have so thoroughly criticized it8
that the time has come for North Carolina to jump once again into the main-
stream of legal thought and abolish the immunity-as a substantial number of
states have done already. 9 While this step seems to be the proper one, neither
the judiciary nor the legislature has been willing to strike the final blow. From
1. Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 585, 118 S.E. 12, 16 (1923).
2. Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
3. Id. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
4. See, eg., McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903); Roller v. Roller, 37
Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905); Hollister, Parent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine In Search of Justiflca-
tion, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 489, 494 & nn.39-40 (1982).
5. Morrison, 185 N.C. at 580-82, 118 S.E. at 13-15. Other reasons offered to support the
immunity included interference with parental discipline, analogy to the interspousal immunity, the
possibility of a parent inheriting the child's recovery, and depletion of family assets otherwise avail-
able to other children. See infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
6. Id. at 586, 118 S.E. at 16.
7. See infra notes 110-19 and accompanying text.
8. Lee v. Mowett Sales Co., 76 N.C. App. 556, 559-62, 334 S.E.2d 250, 252-54 (1985) (Bec-
ton, J., dissenting), aff'd, 316 N.C. 489, 342 S.E.2d 882 (1986); 3 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAM-
ILY LAW § 248, at 298-99 (4th ed. 1981); Hollister, supra note 4, at 489 n.2.
9. See R. LEE, supra note 8, at 301; Annotation, Liability of Parent for Injury to Unemanci-
pated Child Caused by Parent's Negligence-Modern Cases, 6 A.L.R. 4TH 1066, 1113-14 (1981) (It
appears that the parent-child immunity is not supported in the following states: Alaska, Arizona,
California, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont, and Wisconsin.).
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197210 through the recent decision in Coffey v. Coffey,11 when called upon to
abolish the immunity, the courts continually have deferred the task to the legis-
lature in order to avoid "[p]iecemeal abrogation of established law by judicial
decree." 12 The legislature's response in North Carolina General Statutes section
1.539-21 in 197513 and its recent amendment, 14 passed only 11 days after the
Coffey decision, failed to abolish the immunity, providing instead little more
than the "piecemeal abrogation" the courts originally feared.
This Note examines the origin of the parent-child immunity and its growth
and decline in North Carolina. It analyzes the justifications offered as support
for the doctrine and presents the criticisms calling for its abrogation. The Note
concludes that North Carolina should no longer retain the immunity as a bar to
compensation of injured victims. Accordingly, this Note calls upon both the
courts and the legislature to abolish the antiquated doctrine, with the exception
of special provisions for actions relating to the exercise of parental authority.
In Coffey an unemancipated minor was driving the family automobile when
he lost control of the vehicle and crashed into a utility pole.15 As a result, his
mother, a passenger in the car, was injured. 16 The accident occurred on August
17, 1985, while the son was sixteen years old; 17 thus, the parent-child immunity
precluded any suit for recovery. The statute of limitations for the mother's ac-
tion was three years, so she waited until her son turned nineteen and filed suit
against him as an emancipated child.18 The trial court granted summary judg-
ment for the defendant because the son was only sixteen years old at the time of
the accident.19 The North Carolina Court of Appeals recognized that the son
was an adult at the time of suit, but affirmed the trial court's holding that "[t]he
right to sue must exist at the time of the injury and the subsequent emancipation
or majority of the minor is of no consequence." 20 The court noted the criticisms
and the suggestions calling for abrogation of the immunity, but cited the
supreme court's decision in Lee v. Mowett Sales Co. that such action "should be
10. Skinner v. Whitley, 281 N.C. 476, 189 S.E.2d 230 (1972). Skinner marked the first time
that the court deferred abolition of the immunity to the legislature, having decided in previous cases
calling for its abrogation that the immunity would be maintained.
11. 94 N.C. App. 717, 381 S.E.2d 467.
12. Skinner, 281 N.C. at 484, 189 S.E.2d at 235.
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (1975) (allowing suits by children against their parents for
negligent operation of a vehicle), amended by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (Supp. 1989), see supra
notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
14. Section 1-539.21, which only allowed suits by an unemancipated minor against his parents,
was amended to allow parents the right to sue their children for negligent operation of a motor
vehicle. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (Supp. 1989) (amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-536.21 (1975)).
The amended statute states, "The relationship of parent and child shall not bar the right of action by
a person or his estate against his parent or child for wrongful death, personal injury, or property
damage arising out of operation of a motor vehicle owned or operated by the parent or child." Id.
15. Record at 9, Coffey (No. 88CVS27).
16. Coffey, 94 N.C. App. at 718, 381 S.E.2d at 468.
17. Id.
18. Brief for Appellee at 10-11, Coffey (No. 88CVS27).
19. Coffey, 94 N.C. App. at 718, 381 S.E.2d at 468.
20. Id. at 719, 381 S.E.2d at 469.
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done by legislation and not by the Court. '21
The court of appeals noted the statutory exception to the immunity created
by General Statutes section 1-529.21 in 1975 to allow a child to sue his parents
for injuries resulting from a parent's negligent operation of a motor vehicle,22
but concluded that this exception provided no help for the plaintiff in Coffey
because it "is limited and did not abolish the unemancipated minor's immunity
from suits by his parents."' 23 Eleven days after the Coffey decision, the general
assembly amended the statute to allow parents to sue their unemancipated chil-
dren for negligent operation of an automobile.24 Although the amended statute
would have allowed the plaintiff in Coffey to recover, it failed to abrogate fully
the parent-child immunity in North Carolina.
In 1923 the North Carolina Supreme Court judicially adopted the parent-
child immunity in Small v. Morrison25 in which an unemancipated minor sued
her father for injuries sustained in an automobile accident.2 6 Relying on a tril-
ogy of cases27 generally credited with the creation of the parent-child immunity
and its supporting policies28 and noting the absence of any common law ex-
pressly allowing a suit between parent and child, the majority adopted whole-
heartedly the immunity and its justifications. 29 Chief Justice Clark dissented,
criticizing the majority for accepting a rule whose only basis was a Mississippi
decision from 1891, made with neither supporting precedent from English com-
mon law nor any foundation in statutory law.
30
Thus adopted, the immunity denied unemancipated children recovery for
injuries caused by their parents. The courts applied the immunity in children's
suits against their parents, 31 but no case arose until 1965 in which the supreme
court addressed a parent bringing a tort action against a minor child for per-
sonal injuries. In Gillikin v. Burbage32 the mother of a nineteen-year-old child
sued her daughter for injuries sustained when she was struck by the car her
daughter was driving.33 The court's decision, which provided an extensive defi-
21. Id. at 720-21, 381 S.E.2d at 470 (quoting Lee v. Mowett Sales Co., 316 N.C. 489, 494, 342
S.E.2d 882, 885 (1986)).
22. Id. at 719, 381 S.E.2d at 469.
23. Id.
24. See supra note 14.
25. 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923).
26. Id. at 578, 118 S.E. at 12.
27. Id. at 580-81, 118 S.E. at 13-14 (citing Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891);
McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P.
788 (1905)).
28. See Hollister, supra note 4, at 495 & n.41.
29. Morrison, 185 N.C. at 586, 118 S.E. at 16.
30. Id. at 599, 118 S.E. at 23 (Clark, CJ., dissenting).
31. The immunity survived a challenge in 1952 that called for abolition of "the harshness of the
common law" embodied in the parent-child immunity. Redding v. Redding, 235 N.C. 638, 639, 70
S.E.2d 676, 677 (1952). The Redding court refused to abolish the immunity, stating that no statute
had abrogated or changed Small v. Morrison and no other state in the country had abrogated the
immunity for acts of negligence. Id. at 639-40, 70 S.E.2d at 677.
32. 263 N.C. 317, 139 S.E.2d 753 (1965).
33. Id. at 318-19, 139 S.E.2d at 755.
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nition of "emancipation," 34 held that the policies supporting the parent's immu-
nity from suit also supported the child's reciprocal immunity.35 Accordingly,
the court followed "an overwhelming majority ofjurisdictions... [to] hold that
neither a parent nor his personal representative can sue an unemancipated minor
child for a personal tort."
'36
The supreme court was called upon again to abolish the immunity in SMn-
ner v. Whitley,37 in which the administrator for the estate of two deceased
daughters sued the estate of their father for wrongful death following an auto-
mobile accident that occurred while the father was driving. 38 The plaintiff
pleaded for complete abrogation of the immunity, or in the alternative, for par-
tial abolition when either the parent or the unemancipated minor was dead 39 or
the injury arose out of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle.40 The court
reviewed the justifications for the immunity, the criticisms of the doctrine, and
the modifications undertaken by "a growing minority of states,' '41 but concluded
that a complete abrogation was not appropriate. Noting that "no state has to-
tally abrogated parental immunity," 42 the court found that the considerations
supporting the immunity still outweighed the arguments for change.43 In addi-
tion, because of the number of alternatives available for partial abrogation, the
court refused "piecemeal abrogation of established law by judicial decree," 44
deferring to the legislature any innovations in the parent-child immunity.
4 5
In 1975 the General Assembly answered the call with General Statutes sec-
tion 1-539.21, which provided: "The relationship of parent and child shall not
bar the right of action by a minor child against a parent for personal injury or
property damage arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle owned or oper-
ated by such parent."'46 Far short of total abrogation, this enactment only incor-
porated one modification out of the many exceptions enumerated in Skinner:
the abrogation of immunity for negligent operation of an automobile.47 The
cases that followed interpreted the act as removing only the parent's immu-
34. Id. at 321-24, 139 S.E.2d at 757-59.
Complete emancipation occurs by act of the parent when he surrenders all right to the
services and earnings of the child, as well as the right to the custody and control of his
person.... Complete emancipation arises by operation of law irrespective of the parent's
consent when a child marries,. . . when the child becomes twenty-one years old,... [or]
when the parent abandons or fails to support the child ....
Id. at 322, 139 S.E.2d at 757-58 (citations omitted).
35. Id. at 321, 139 S.E.2d at 757 (citing R. LEE, supra note 8, at 176).
36. Id.
37. 281 N.C. 476, 189 S.E.2d 230 (1972).
38. Id. at 476-77, 189 S.E.2d at 230.
39. Id. at 479, 189 S.E.2d at 232.
40. Id. at 483, 189 S.E.2d at 234.
41. Id. at 480-82, 189 S.E.2d at 232-34.
42. Id. at 480, 189 S.E.2d at 233.
43. Id. at 484, 189 S.E.2d at 235.
44. Id. at 483-84, 189 S.E.2d at 235.
45. Id. at 484, 189 S.E.2d at 235.
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (1975), amended by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (Supp.
1989).
47. Skinner v. Whitley, 281 N.C. 476, 482, 189 S.E.2d 230, 234 (1972).
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nity,48 thus allowing an unemancipated child's suit, but still barring a parent's
action against the child.
This narrow action taken by the legislature resulted in nothing more than
the piecemeal abrogation the Skinner court sought to avoid. Nevertheless, the
supreme court maintained its position by again deferring to the legislature when
next asked to abolish the immunity. In Lee v. Mowett Sales Co.49 a father in-
jured his young daughter when he backed over her foot with a riding lawn-
mower.50 The girl brought suit against the manufacturer, who then filed a third-
party claim for contribution against the father.5 1 After the court of appeals af-
firmed the dismissal of the third-party complaint52 over a strenuous dissent by
Judge Becton, 53 the manufacturer called upon the supreme court to abolish the
immunity. After noting the then-existing exceptions to the immunity5 4 and the
growing trend in other states to abolish or modify it,55 the supreme court inter-
preted the legislature's limited action as a conscious decision to retain the doc-
trine. Accordingly, the court refused to abrogate it, explaining that "[t]o
judicially abolish the parent-child immunity doctrine after the legislature has
considered and retained the doctrine would be to engage in impermissible judi-
cial legislation. If the doctrine is to be abolished at this late date, it should be
done by legislation and not by the Court."
'56
Before the court of appeals' decision in Coffey, the parent-child immunity
barred actions between unemancipated children and their parents for ordinary
negligence,5 7 with the exception of suits by children against their parents for
negligent operation of a motor vehicle.5 8 The immunity extended to actions by
third parties seeking contribution, 9 but did not apply to willful and malicious
acts, contract or property rights, or torts committed after emancipation. 6°
The court of appeals' decision in Coffey maintained the position of the
North Carolina courts by refusing either to abolish or modify the immunity.
6 1
The court's holding actually reaffirmed the immunity by refusing to allow ac-
tions after emancipation of the minor for injuries arising during minority.62
48. Camp v. Camp, 89 N.C. App. 347, 348, 365 S.E.2d 675, 676 (1988); Allen v. Allen, 76 N.C.
App. 504, 506, 333 S.E.2d 530, 532, disc. rev. denied, 315 N.C. 182, 337 S.E.2d 855 (1985).
The Allen court also held that the statute violated neither the parents' substantive due process
nor equal protection rights. Allen, 76 N.C. App. at 506-07, 333 S.E.2d at 532-33.
49. 316 N.C. 489, 342 S.E.2d 882 (1986).
50. Id. at 490, 342 S.E.2d at 883.
51. Id.
52. Lee v. Mowett Sales Co., 76 N.C. App. 556, 558, 334 S.E.2d 250, 252 (1985), aff'd, 316
N.C. 489, 342 S.E.2d 882 (1986).
53. Id. at 559, 334 S.E.2d at 252 (Becton, J. dissenting).
54. Mowett Sales, 316 N.C. at 492, 342 S.E.2d at 884.
55. Id. at 494, 342 S.E.2d at 885.
56. Id.
57. R. LEE, supra note 8, at 289-91.
58. Coffey, 94 N.C. App. at 719, 381 S.E.2d at 469.
59. Mowett Sales, 316 N.C. at 490, 342 S.E.2d at 883.
60. Coffey, 94 N.C. App. at 719, 381 S.E.2d at 469.
61. Id. at 720-21, 381 S.E.2d at 470.
62. Id. at 719-20, 381 S.E.2d at 469. The defendant claimed that the allowance of suits after
1990]
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This decision to require that the right of action exist at the time of the injury is
correct if the immunity is to be retained. Otherwise, plaintiffs could easily avoid
the immunity when the unemancipated minor would reach majority within the
time allowed by the statute of limitations. The more important issue, however,
is the propriety of the immunity itself.
The virtually immediate action of the general assembly in amending Gen-
eral Statute section 1-539.21 clearly abolished the immunity's application to the
negligent operation of automobiles, but the legislature's position on the immu-
nity for ordinary negligence in nonautomobile cases remains unclear. Undoubt-
edly the courts will interpret this latest enactment as a decision by the legislature
to maintain what is left of the immunity. An examination of the justifications
offered to support the parent-child immunity, however, proves the doctrine is a
judicial anachronism that should not outweigh an innocent injured party's right
to recover for his injuries.
All but one of the rationales offered in support of the immunity date back to
the "great trilogy" 63 of cases that formulated the doctrine: Hewlett v. George,64
McKelvey v. McKelvey,65 and Roller v. Roller.66 These cases67 stated the follow-
ing reasons as necessitating the doctrine:
1) disturbance of family harmony;68
2) interference with parental care, control, and discipline;69
3) analogy of parent-child immunity to interspousal immunity;70
4) the possibility that the parent might reacquire the child's tort damages
through inheritance;71
5) payment to the injured child would deplete the parents' assets to the
detriment of plaintiff's siblings; 72 and
6) the possibility of fraud and collusion in the presence of liability
insurance.
73
emancipation for injuries occurring before emancipation would effectively abolish the immunity for
any child over fourteen years old. Brief for Appellee at 11, Coffey (No. 88CVS27).
63. Hollister, supra note 4, at 495 & n.41.
64. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
65. 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
66. 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
67. A number of judicial opinions, law review articles, and notes have analyzed and reviewed
these well-known cases. See Skinner v. Whitley, 281 N.C. 476, 479-80, 189 S.E.2d 230, 232 (1972);
Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 580-83, 118 S.E. 12, 13-15 (1923); Hollister, supra note 4, at 493-
96; Wyatt, The Last Pangs of Parent-Child Immunity in North Carolina: Lee v. Mowett Sales Co.
and Allen v. Alien, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 607, 611-13 (1987); Note, Lee v. Mowett Sales Co.:
North Carolina Retains Its Partial Parent-Child Immunity Doctrine, 65 N.C.L. REv. 1457, 1459-60
(1987).
68. See George, 68 Miss. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
69. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. at 390, 77 S.W. at 664.
70. Id. at 391, 77 S.W. at 665.
71. Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 245, 79 P. 788, 789 (1905).
72. Id.
73. Lee v. Mowett Sales Co., 76 N.C. App. 556, 562, 334 S.E.2d 250, 254 (1985) (Becton, J.,
dissenting), aff'd, 316 N.C. 489, 342 SE.2d 882 (1986); R. LEE, supra note 8, at 298-99; Hollister,
supra note 4, at 500 & n.81 (collecting cases).
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The maintenance of family harmony, the main reason in Justice Stacy's
eloquent argument for adopting the immunity in North Carolina,74 is a convinc-
ing rationale that draws upon fundamental desires for a peaceful and loving fam-
ily atmosphere. Although a laudable goal, the immunity fails to achieve this
purpose. Disallowing recovery for injuries by judicial action does little to main-
tain or protect family harmony. If family harmony exists, family members pre-
sumably would not bring suit against each other.75 Where it is absent, the injury
alone causes disruption, as evidenced by the action of bringing a suit.7 6 Barring
the action only requires the injured party to bear the.loss and assumes "that an
uncompensated tort makes for peace in the family."' "7 With the presence of
liability insurance, however, the suit is between the child and the parent's insur-
ance company.78 Because the child does not look to a parent for recovery, the
parent and child are not adversaries and the suit does not disrupt family har-
mony. Payment by a third party may "actually alleviate family disharmony by
removing the financial burden caused by an unexpected injury" 79 while allowing
the injured victim to recover.
In addition, this rationale falters in light of the several forms of intrafamily
liability presently recognized in North Carolina. The immunity does not pre-
vent emancipated children from suing their parents.80 Unemancipated siblings
.apparently can sue one another.8 ' Spouses may now sue one another following
the abolition of the interspousal immunity.8 2 The traditional allowance of suits
between unemancipated minors and their parents for contract and property
rights,8 3 as well as suits for intentional torts,84 further discredits the rationale.
Finally, the abolition of the immunity for negligent operation of a vehicle by
General Statutes section 1-539.21 virtually renders the family harmony rationale
inapplicable because the majority of parent-child suits arise from automobile
accidents.8 5 Although this exception to the immunity may not cause dishar-
mony in the presence of insurance, the legislature evidently was not concerned
about family harmony because recovery is not limited to the amount of insur-
ance coverage.
8 6
74. See supra text accompanying note 1.
75. Mowett Sales, 76 N.C. App. at 561-62, 334 S.E.2d at 254 (Becton, J., dissenting).
76. Hollister, supra note 4, at 502 ("lilt is the injury itself which is the disruptive act.") (quot-
ing Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 380, 282 A.2d 351, 355 (1971)).
77. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 122, at 905 (W. Keeton, 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER].
78. Hollister, supra note 4, at 503 (citing Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 88, 471 P.2d 282, 284
(1970) (en banc)).
79. Id.
80. "The complete emancipation of a child ... removes the bar to actions between parent and
child for personal torts." Gillikin v. Burbage, 263 N.C. 317, 321, 139 S.E.2d 753, 757 (1965).
81. R. LEE, supra note 8, at 298.
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-5 (1984).
83. Lee v. Mowett Sales Co., 316 N.C. 489,492, 342 S.E.2d 882, 884 (1986); R. LEE, supra note
8, at 294 & 301.
84. Mowett Sales, 316 N.C. at 492, 342 S.E.2d at 884.
85. R. LEE, supra note 8, at 298 ("Most of the cases have arisen in connection with automobile
accidents.").
86. Lee v. Mowett Sales Co., 76 N.C. App. 556, 561, 334 S.E.2d 250, 253-54 (1985) (Becton, J.,
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The rationale of parental care, control, and discipline is the strongest justifi-
cation for the immunity8 7 and it has presented the most difficulty for states that
have modified or abolished the immunity. The admitted significance of this ra-
tionale, however, does not justify barring all suits for negligent injury between
parent and child. When the injury does not result from an exercise or failure to
exercise parental authority or control, this rationale should not bar recovery. a8
The exceptions to the immunity recognize this by allowing recovery for inten-
tional torts, property and contract actions, and negligent operation of a motor
vehicle,8 9 when parental authority is not an issue.
Rather than barring all suits between parent and child, a better solution
would be to abolish the immunity with a narrow exception providing immunity
for injuries arising out of the exercise of parental authority or discretion. Most
states abolishing or modifying the immunity have accepted this logic90 by adopt-
ing one of two standards that have provisions for parental authority. The stan-
dard adopted in California9 1 allows the suit and judges the parent on what "an
ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent [would] have done in similar circum-
stances."' 92 The other standard, which is followed by "a substantial minority of
jurisdictions,19 3 is known as the Goller94 approach. This standard abolishes the
immunity except: "1) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of
parental authority over the child, and 2) where the alleged negligent act in-
volves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of
food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care." 9 5 These
two alternatives to the immunity allow suits by innocent victims while maintain-
ing respect for a parent's constitutional right96 to be free from interference by
the state. Accordingly, these standards practically nullify the fear of interfer-
ence with parental discretion as a justification for maintaining the immunity as a
complete bar to suits between parent and child.
The analogy between parent-child immunity and interspousal immunity
was misplaced from the beginning; the legal fiction at common law viewing the
husband and wife as one entity that could not sue and recover from itself
97
dissenting) ("[Nothing in the statute limits recovery against a parent to the limits of the parent's
insurance coverage."), aff'd, 316 N.C. 489, 342 S.E.2d 882 (1986).
87. "The parental right has been afforded constitutional protection.. . ." Hollister, supra note
4, at 505 (citing Belloti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (recognizing parent's right to be free of
undue interference by the state in matters of child-rearing); Quillon v. Wallcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255
(1978) (recognizing that parent-child relationship is constitutionally protected)).
88. "The reluctance to undermine parental authority should be a factor only when the injury
results from an exercise of that authority." Id.
89. See infra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.
90. Lee v. Mowett Sales Co., 76 N.C. App. 556, 562-64, 334 S.E.2d 250, 254-55 (1985) (Becton,
J., dissenting), aff'd, 316 N.C. 489, 342 S.E.2d 882 (1986).
91. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971).
92. Id. at 921, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
93. Mowett Sales, 76 N.C. App. at 563, 334 S.E.2d at 255 (Becton, J., dissenting).
94. Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
95. Id. at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198.
96. See supra note 87.
97. PROSSER, supra note 77, § 102, at 901-02.
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never existed between parent and child.98 In addition, this rationale completely
fails in light of the general assembly's abrogation of the interspousal immunity.99
The chance that the parent may inherit the child's recovery is a remote
possibility. The child would have to predecease the parent and the parent would
have to take from the child's estate through intestacy or by bequest. Most un-
likely of all, the award would have to be present in the child's estate, the child
not having spent it during her lifetime.100 The improbability of this combina-
tion of events proves this justification an unfair bar to the claims of all uneman-
cipated minors. If the legislature finds this a legitimate concern, 101 it should
simply prohibit the parent from inheriting any portion of the award.'0 2 Finally,
this policy by itself provides very little justification for barring ordinary negli-
gence suits in light of actions allowed for intentional torts, property and contract
damages, and negligent operation of a motor vehicle.'
0 3
The policy of preventing recovery that would deplete the resources avail-
able to other siblings is likewise unsound. In many cases the injured minor will
have no siblings, making this justification inapplicable. Nonetheless, the immu-
nity still bars an only child from recovery0 4 Even if there are other children
whose resources may be depleted, the injured child should still receive compen-
sation rather than bear the burden of the injury so that his siblings' standard of
living does not decrease. The presence of insurance weakens this policy because
the compensation comes from a third party and does not deplete the family
resources.'0 5 The exceptions to the immunity also undermine this supporting
rationale. Recovery is allowed for property and contract damages, injury from
intentional torts, and for negligent operation of a vehicle. These actions, as well
as all actions allowing third parties to recover for their injuries, deplete the re-
sources of the family, but the strong policy of allowing recovery by innocent
victims receives priority. That one is in a family relation still covered by the
immunity does not make him any less worthy of compensation.
Finally, the argument that the presence of insurance provides an incentive
for family members to conspire to obtain fraudulently an unjustified recovery
"is, at best, a secondary concern. The potential for fraud and collusion exists in
all litigation and does not justify precluding the cause of action for an injured
child."i'C6 The case should go to court where "rules for impeachment by cross
examination"' 10 7 will deal with the possibility of fraud. Evidently, the courts feel
98. Id. § 102, at 904.
99. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
100. See Hollister, supra note 4, at 497.
101. Only when an insurance company pays the child would the parent profit from his own
wrongdoing. If the parent paid the damages the inheritance would constitute a return, not a profit.
See id.
102. See id. at 498; Wyatt, supra note 67, at 616.
103. See infra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.
104. See Hollister, supra note 4, at 500.
105. Id.
106. Lee v. Mowett Sales Co., 76 N.C. App. 556, 562, 334 S.E.2d 250, 254 (1985) (Becton, J.,
dissenting), aff'd, 316 N.C. 489, 342 S.E.2d 882 (1986).
107. Id. (Becton, 3., dissenting).
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competent to handle the possibility of fraud in other family relations, such as
husband and wife and parent and child for the exceptions allowed to the parent-
child immunity.10 8 Regardless of the ability of courts to detect fraud. seeking to
avoid the possible fraudulent behavior of a few does not justify barring recovery
to all claimants, the great majority of whom are innocent victims with actual
injuries. "Indeed, some courts have held that a state may not constitutionally
rely solely on the danger of collusion to deny an entire class of people the right
to bring suit."' 9
Dissatisfaction with the inequities resulting from application of the immu-
nity has led to the creation of so many exceptions that it is unclear what remains
of the immunity. "'Constant criticism of the immunity has led to its erosion by
the development of numerous exceptions to it, which have been more or less
sporadically recognized by many courts, until there are now very few jurisdic-
tions, if any, in which the immunity exists in any complete form.'"110 The
North Carolina Supreme Court noted these exceptions in Skinner v. Whitley. 1
Courts have applied exceptions to allow suits between parents and unemanci-
pated children1 12 when: death of the parent or child has terminated the parent-
child relationship; 13 injury results from conduct so outrageous as to destroy
family harmony itself;114 the injury is willful and intentional;11 5 a dual relation-
ship exists, such as master-servant, that makes the parent-child relationship inci-
dental; 1 6 the child is injured while the parent is acting within the scope of his
employment (the child can recover under respondeat superior and the employer
cannot raise the immunity, which is personal to the parent);117 the action in-
volves property or contract rights;118 or the injury results from the negligent
108. See infra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.
109. Hollister, supra note 4, at 501 (citing Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751, 761-62, 518 P.2d 362,
370-71 (1974); Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855,. 859-60, 506 P.2d 212, 215, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388, 391
(1973) (en banc)).
110. Lee v. Mowett Sales Co., 76 N.C. App. 556, 563, 334 S.E.2d 250, 255 (Becton, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting REs.ATMENT (SECOND) O1 TORTS § 895G, at 428 (1979)), aff'd, 316 N.C. 489, 342
S.E.2d 882 (1986).
111. 281 N.C. 476, 480-82, 189 S.E.2d 230, 233-34 (1972).
112. The supreme court recognized the validity of suits by emancipated children for actions
arising after emancipation in Lee v. Mowett Sales Co., 316 N.C. 489, 492, 342 S.E.2d 882, 884
(1986).
113. Skinner, 281 N.C. at 480-81, 189 S.E.2d at 233 (citing cases from jurisdictions that have
adopted this modification). The supreme court refused the exception for death of parent or child in
Skinner, 281 N.C. at 479, 189 S.E.2d at 233.
114. Id. at 481, 189 S.E.2d at 233 (citing cases from jurisdictions adopting this exception). The
exception for outrageous conduct apparently has not been at issue in any North Carolina case.
115. Id. (citing cases from jurisdictions adopting this modification). North Carolina adopted
this exception in Lee v. Mowett Sales Co., 316 N.C. 489, 492, 342 S.E.2d 882, 884 (1986).
116. Skinner, 281 N.C. at 481, 189 S.E.2d at 233 (citing cases from jurisdictions adopting this
modification). This exception apparently has not been at issue in a North Carolina case.
117. Id. North Carolina recognizes this exception. See R. LEE, supra note 8, at 302-03 (quoting
Wright v. Wright, 229 N.C. 503, 507-08, 50 S.E.2d 540, 544 (1948) ("The personal immunity from
suit because of the domestic relation does not extend to the employer so as to cancel his liability or
defeat recovery on the principle respondeat superior when the injury was inflicted by the servant
acting as such.")).
118. Mowett Sales, 316 N.C. at 492, 342 S.E.2d at 884.
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operation of a motor vehicle.' 19 These exceptions, most resulting from dissatis-
faction with the immunity, have weakened the justifications supporting the im-
munity. While North Carolina has not adopted all of the above exceptions,
120
those that do apply in this state confirm the absence of justification for the par-
ent-child immunity as a complete bar to recovery by innocent victims. This is
especially true in light of the recent amendment of General Statute section 1-
539.21 which effectively cripples all but the parental authority rationale.
Today the immunity bars suits between parents and their children for inju-
ries due to negligent acts arising out of the parent-child relationship, with the
exception of injuries resulting from negligent operation of an automobile. As
discussed above, the reasons for allowing this immunity are outdated and se-
verely weakened because of the exceptions North Carolina recognizes. Accord-
ingly, the logical course of action is to reject the immunity as a complete bar and
allow recovery for injured victims.
12 1
This Note suggests that North Carolina should abolish the parent-child im-
munity. The courts or the legislature, however, should provide cases involving
parental authority with an exception similar to that presented by the Goller stan-
dard, disallowing recovery only when the alleged injury arises from negligence
involving the exercise of parental authority or discretion with respect to necessi-
ties. The exception should be narrowly prescribed with the goal of allowing
recovery for innocent victims while affording adequate protection to the parent's
right to raise her child as she sees fit. The reasonableness standard adopted in
California infringes upon this right by allowing a jury to second-guess parental
decisions or activities that may be viewed as unorthodox. 122 An exception simi-
lar to the Goller standard would protect the parent from suits for negligent in-
jury when the jury decides the activity was within the parent's authority or
discretion, thus respecting the parent's decision to raise her child as she chooses.
Because gross negligence or intentional injury would result in the parent's liabil-
ity, even if the activity was within the parent's authority or discretion, the stan-
dard protects the child from abuse in the disguise of unorthodox discipline.
Although legislative action may be the simplest route to the much needed
abrogation of the immunity, the courts are free to act when legislative action
falls short. "After all, courts, not legislatures, created the doctrine. And most
states that have abolished parental immunity have done so by court decision, not
119. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (1989); see supra note 14.
120. See supra notes 111-19.
121. In the light of the ever-increasing criticism of the general rule that an action for per-
sonal injuries cannot be maintained between parent and child, and the growing number of
exceptions to the rule, it seems that the time has arrived for its abolishment. We should
frankly recognize that the earlier cases were wrongly decided. The reasons therein stated
are no longer convincing.... The rules of law should be founded on reason; and when the
reason for a rule has ceased to exist, the rule should cease to exist. Any reason that seems
to sustain the continuation of the rule is outweighed by the general consideration that
where there is a wrong there should be a remedy.
R. LEE, supra note 8, at 298-99.
122. See Hollister, supra note 4, at 516.
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by statute." 123 The North Carolina courts repeatedly have deferred the aboli-
tion of the immunity to the legislature, but "[ilt is appropriate for courts to
modify or abolish doctrines that they have created that no longer serve the inter-
ests of justice.' 1 24 Perhaps the North Carolina Supreme Court will soon heed
these words of Judge Becton and take appropriate action. In light of its past
decisions, however, the court will probably see the recent action by the legisla-
ture in General Statutes section 1-539.21 as a conscious decision to retain what
is left of the immunity rather than recognize it as the "piecemeal abrogation" the
supreme court has sought to avoid. The legislature's amendment to General
Statute section 1-539.21 was a step in the right direction, but fell short of taldng
North Carolina where it should be regarding the parent-child immunity. The
proper destination is abrogation of the immunity and both the judiciary and the
legislature are free to take the appropriate step. The only remaining question
123. Lee v. Mowett Sales Co., 76 N.C. App. 556, 564-65, 334 S.E.2d 250, 255 (1985) (Becton, J.,
dissenting), aff'd, 316 N.C. 489, 342 S.E.2d 882 (1986).
The following states have partially or completely abolished or refused to adopt the immunity by
judicial decision: Alaska, Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 15 (Alaska 1967) (no immunity for accidents
resulting from parent's negligent driving); Arizona, Sandoval v. Sandoval, 128 Ariz. 11, 12-14, 623
P.2d 800, 801-03 (1981) (immunity abrogated except where injury resulted from breach of duty
owed child within the family sphere); California, Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 921, 479 P.2d 648,
653, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 293 (1971) (en bane) (immunity abrogated and parent judged by "reasonable
parent" standard); Delaware, Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669, 673 (Del. 1976) (no immunity
where injury caused by automobile accident, to the extent that there is liability insurance); Hawaii,
Petersen v. City of Honolulu, 51 Haw. 484, 486, 462 P.2d 1007, 1008 (1970) (no parent-child immu-
nity); Iowa, Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786, 789 (Iowa 1981) (immunity abrogated where tor-
tious conduct is outside area of parental authority and discretion); Kansas, Nocktonick v.
Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 765, 611 P.2d 135, 141 (1980) (immunity abrogated for injuries sustained
in automobile accidents); Kentucky, Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Ky. 1970) (immunity
only for reasonable exercise of parental authority or discretion); Maine, Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d
634, 639-40 (Me. 1979) (immunity abrogated in automobile cases, but court stated that the abroga-
tion was not limited to automobile accidents); Massachusetts, Sorenson v. Sorenson, 369 Mass. 350,
351-54, 339 N.E.2d 907, 911-16 (1975) (immunity abrogated for negligent operation of automobile,
but a later case suggested that immunity may be abrogated in other instances); Lewis v. Lewis, 370
Mass. 619, 629-30, 351 N.E.2d 526, 532-33 (1976); Michigan, Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 8, 199
N.W.2d 169, 172-73 (1972) (immunity only if negligence involved reasonable exercise of parental
authority or discretion); Minnesota, Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 599-601 (Minn. 1980)
(no immunity-parent judged on "reasonable parent" standard); Nevada, Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev.
397, 40405, 528 P.2d 1013, 1017-18 (1974) (no immunity); New Hampshire, Briere v. Briere, 107
N.H. 432, 434-35, 224 A.2d 588, 590-91 (1966) (no immunity); New Jersey, Small v. Rockfeld, 66
N.J. 231, 244, 330 A.2d 335, 343 (1974) (immunity abrogated where neither the exercise of parental
authority nor the adequacy of child care is in issue); New York, Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d
434,437-39, 245 N.E.2d 192, 193-94, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 530-32 (1969) (parent-child immunity abro-
gated for non-willful torts); North Dakota, Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364, 366-67 (N.D. 1967)
(no parent-child immunity for negligence); Oklahoma, Unah v. Martin, 676 P.2d 1366, 1369-70
(Okla. 1984) (no immunity where injury resulted from negligent operation of an automobile, to the
extent of parent's liability insurance); Pennsylvania, Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 375-76, 282 A.2d
351, 353 (1971) (no parent-child immunity); South Carolina, Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132, 137, 268
S.E.2d 109, 111-12 (1980) (no parent-child immunity); Vermont, Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119, 121-
22, 370 A.2d 191, 193 (1977) (refused to recognize immunity, but indicated that limitations might be
placed on parent-child actions); Virginia, Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 182-86, 183 S.E.2d 190,
192-94 (1971) (child may recover for injuries resulting from automobile accident); Washington,
Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93 Wash. 2d 411, 416, 610 P.2d 891, 893 (1980) (en bane) (immunity abrogated
where child injured in automobile accident due to parent's negligence); West Virginia, Lee v. Comer,
224 S.E.2d 721, 723-25 (W. Va. 1976) (no immunity where child injured in automobile accident due
to parent's negligence); and Wisconsin, Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 413, 122 N.W.2d 193, 198
(1963) (no immunity except where negligence involved exercise of parental authority or discretion).
See Hollister, supra note 4, at 528-532; see also Annotation, supra note 9, at 1114-22.
124. Mowett Sales, 76 N.C. App. at 565, 334 S.E.2d at 256 (Becton, J., dissenting).
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concerning the abolition of the parent-child immunity in North Carolina is who
is going to do it.
HARLIN RAY DEAN, JNR.
